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全球化（globalization）一詞，是一種概念，也是一種人類社會(huì)發(fā)展的現(xiàn)象過(guò)程。全球化目前有諸多定義，通常意義上的全球化是指全球聯(lián)系不斷增強(qiáng)，人類生活在全球規(guī)模的基礎(chǔ)上發(fā)展及全球意識(shí)的崛起。國(guó)與國(guó)之間在政治、經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易上互相依存。全球化亦可以解釋為世界的壓縮和視全球?yàn)橐粋€(gè)整體。二十世紀(jì)九十年代后，隨著全球化勢(shì)力對(duì)人類社會(huì)影響層面的擴(kuò)張，已逐漸引起各國(guó)政治、教育、社會(huì)及文化等學(xué)科領(lǐng)域的重視，引發(fā)大規(guī)模的研究熱潮。對(duì)于“全球化”的觀感是好是壞，目前仍是見仁見智，例如全球化對(duì)于本土文化來(lái)說(shuō)就是一把雙刃劍，它也會(huì)使得本土文化的內(nèi)涵與自我更新能力逐漸模糊與喪失。
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陶短房：白宮否認(rèn)伊萬(wàn)卡出任世行行長(zhǎng)，那下一任究竟會(huì)是誰(shuí)？
文 | 全球化智庫(kù)（CCG）特邀研究員陶短房
2019年1月22日 -
Victor Gao: Here’s a win-win zero-tariffs trade deal
Here’s a win-win zero-tariffs trade deal that Donald Trump and Xi Jinping should shake on ? By?Victor Gao,?vice president of CCG How the United States and China deal with each other in 2019 is of vital importance, as it will have an impact not only on these two countries, but on the world as a whole.? The US-China trade war, unprecedented in scale and severity, has further increased the risks to peace and development. Fortunately, US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Argentina on December 1, and agreed to a?three-month truce?before more tariffs would be imposed on Chinese exports to the US. ? Towards the end of December, Trump and Xi had a?pleasant phone call?and exchanged New Year greetings. In early January, the Chinese and US teams?met in Beijing?for extensive dialogue to hash out the details and narrow the differences on trade. ? Although there was no joint communique after this round of working-level talks, it is expected that Chinese Vice-Premier Liu He will?visit Washington?before the end of January for higher-level dialogue, and that Xi and Trump will review the results of this dialogue and decide how China-US relations should proceed. ? The world is holding its breath for what may or may not happen. The general expectation is that, for their mutual benefit as well as global economic peace, it is better for the US and China to move on from the trade war to what matters the most: development. ? It is important to note that, although the trade war involves mostly?tariffs?and should be more accurately called the tariff war, the fundamental issue facing the US is equal, unhindered access to the?Chinese market, which has become the world’s largest consumer market. ? To help China and the US strike a better deal, I propose a reciprocal zero-tariff agreement. ? Some background: In bilateral trade between the world’s two largest economies, there is a?huge imbalance?against the US. While the exact statistics differ between China and the US (because of the different benchmarks used), for argument’s sake, let us consider the most recent Chinese customs data. ? In 2018, US imports to China rose to US$155.1 billion and Chinese exports to the US to US$478.4 billion, which means that the US is running a trade deficit of US$323.3 billion (and China, a surplus of US$323.3 billion). Such a large imbalance is obviously not conducive to the constructive development of China-US relations. Yet, while Trump has emphasised the importance of balanced trade, it may not be realistic to expect an instant rebalancing, given the strong interconnectedness between the two economies. ? Over the past year, the Chinese and US trade delegations have largely been involved in bean counting. As important as that may be, it is high time to get a macro and fundamental perspective of bilateral trade. This is the rationale behind the reciprocal zero-tariff arrangement between China and the US, which would include the following key points. ? 1. Reciprocity: China and the US would impose zero tariffs on imports or exports between each other, in the amount of US imports to China. The figure would be adjusted every year, according to changes in US imports to China. So, for the past year, for example, China and the US would qualify for zero tariffs on US$155.1 billion of Chinese goods exported to the US and US$155.1 billion of US goods imported to China. ? 2. Tariff exemption or otherwise: A sizeable amount of Chinese exports to the US (around US$150 billion) are manufactured by US companies operating in China. The US government could use its discretion in granting tariff exemptions to these US companies or levying certain tariffs on their goods. ? 3. Normal tariffs or otherwise: for the remainder of Chinese exports to the US, the US could levy normal tariffs, the lowest possible tariffs, or zero tariffs. ? 4. Annual readjustment: As the amount of US imports to China would be used as the benchmark for the reciprocal zero-tariff agreement, the agreement would be adjusted according to the amount every year. ? Under this arrangement,?both the US and China would be winners and there would be more balanced and sustainable trade?between them.?For the US, one key advantage of this arrangement is guaranteed greater access to the increasingly important Chinese market. ? There is no doubt that this arrangement would result in more US goods being imported to China, which would help create more jobs in the US. Initially, China could be uneasy about granting zero tariffs to all imports from the US, especially agricultural goods, but let us hope that both China and the US recognise the greater good that could be brought about by this arrangement. ? If this becomes a reality, both Xi and Trump should get recognition for their wisdom, vision and courage. While former US President Richard Nixon has been hailed as the leader who opened the door to China, Trump could go down in history as the one who opened up a zero-tariffs Chinese market for US goods, thanks to his repeated emphasis on reciprocity and fairer access to the Chinese market. This could be a happy, win-win arrangement for the people of China and the US, who would be able to put the trade war behind them and rededicate themselves to expanding economic engagement between China and the US for mutual benefit. There is no doubt the world will be a better and safer place with more trade, and fairer and more sustainable trade, between the two largest economies. About Author? Victor Gao,?vice president of Center for China and Globalization(CCG), the chairman of China Energy Security Institute.
2019年1月22日 -
崔洪建：脫歐鬧劇暴露歐美政治“黑洞”
專家簡(jiǎn)介
2019年1月21日 -
李衛(wèi)鋒：修墻與關(guān)門，到底是“千年大計(jì)”還是“當(dāng)下買賣”？
李衛(wèi)鋒，全球化智庫(kù)（CCG）執(zhí)行秘書長(zhǎng)，博士生導(dǎo)師 新年伊始，由于“美墨邊境墻”的資金一直沒(méi)談攏，在經(jīng)歷了兩周多的美國(guó)政府“關(guān)門”之后，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普威脅稱美國(guó)政府在接下來(lái)的“幾個(gè)月或者幾年”還會(huì)繼續(xù)關(guān)門，直到“修墻”的資金通過(guò)為止，現(xiàn)在看起來(lái)局面“僵”住了，除非有一方讓步。 當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間2019年1月6日，美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普乘專機(jī)從戴維營(yíng)，返回白宮后接受記者采訪，堅(jiān)持要求為修建美國(guó)和墨西哥邊境隔離墻撥款。圖片來(lái)源：東方IC 在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上，盤點(diǎn)一下可以發(fā)現(xiàn)，特朗普作為他自稱的“說(shuō)話最算數(shù)”的美國(guó)總統(tǒng)，當(dāng)時(shí)的諸多競(jìng)選承諾，包括一些當(dāng)初大家都覺(jué)得是“嘴炮”的一些“大事”，比如擴(kuò)軍、貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)、減稅、推翻奧巴馬醫(yī)保法案等等，都在某種程度上“實(shí)現(xiàn)”了。而當(dāng)初看起來(lái)最簡(jiǎn)單的，美墨邊境建墻計(jì)劃，雖然連續(xù)弄了3次“政府關(guān)門”，現(xiàn)在甚至做出“關(guān)門幾年”的威脅，看起來(lái)還遙遙無(wú)期。 為了弄明白這個(gè)事情，首先得從非法移民這個(gè)歷史老問(wèn)題說(shuō)起。據(jù)統(tǒng)計(jì)美國(guó)境內(nèi)的非法移民約為1100-2000萬(wàn)人，其中超過(guò)一半來(lái)自墨西哥，而加利福尼亞州則有逾250萬(wàn)非法移民。據(jù)相關(guān)研究和媒體報(bào)道，以非法移民為主的家庭超過(guò)60%享受各種福利計(jì)劃；非法移民共有100萬(wàn)左右，包括20萬(wàn)有犯罪前科者在判處驅(qū)逐出境后滯留美國(guó)。 美國(guó)國(guó)土安全部報(bào)告顯示，每年有近200億美金的毒品從墨西哥販賣到美國(guó)。屢禁不止的毒品交易和武器走私，帶來(lái)的社會(huì)治安問(wèn)題也讓美墨兩國(guó)政府倍感頭疼，數(shù)目巨大的“存量”非法移民，給美國(guó)帶來(lái)了復(fù)雜的社會(huì)問(wèn)題和高昂的經(jīng)濟(jì)成本。 但修墻這事不是特朗普首創(chuàng)。 “美墨邊界圍欄（Mexico–United States barrier）”于2006年小布什執(zhí)政期間，在激烈辯論和示威聲中通過(guò)并執(zhí)行，然而進(jìn)度不如人意。直到2016年，修建長(zhǎng)度都未達(dá)到預(yù)期，更嚴(yán)重的是，“圍欄”斷斷續(xù)續(xù)，有著非常容易穿過(guò)的缺口。 特朗普對(duì) “漏洞百出”的“圍欄”是不滿意的，這離他希望的“高大”、“漂亮”的墻有著不小的差距。因此，在2016年美國(guó)大選的時(shí)候，特朗普的主要競(jìng)選承諾之一就是修完整的“墻”。特朗普是第一個(gè)打破政治禁忌，稱之為“墻”的總統(tǒng)，因此也獲得了粉絲的熱烈擁護(hù)，當(dāng)然這也成為了最具爭(zhēng)議性的話題。 那到底是不是只有修“墻”才能解決美國(guó)的非法移民問(wèn)題呢？美國(guó)不管是從道德層面出發(fā)，還是從實(shí)際利益出發(fā)，都不可能驅(qū)逐現(xiàn)有的數(shù)量龐大的非法移民，亦不可能將現(xiàn)有的非法移民團(tuán)體全部合法化（大赦），以上兩種做法都只會(huì)使得矛盾更加激化，最后不可收拾。 那么，作為政府，為了安撫民眾，平息爭(zhēng)議，只有唯一的選項(xiàng)：讓大家相信，政府會(huì)嚴(yán)格控制邊境，不會(huì)有更多的非法移民入境美國(guó)，解決民眾的焦慮。 當(dāng)?shù)貢r(shí)間2018年11月14日，墨西哥蒂華納，第一批批來(lái)自中美洲的大篷車移民抵達(dá)美墨邊境，其中一些人還爬上了美國(guó)建造的邊境墻，向特朗普示威的意味明顯。圖片來(lái)源：東方IC 嚴(yán)控非法移民入境，是美國(guó)政府、兩院和社會(huì)都有的共識(shí)，但是否修“墻”，差異就相當(dāng)大了。中期選舉之前，共和黨掌握參眾兩院，墻沒(méi)有修起來(lái)。如今民主黨2019年1月3日就當(dāng)家眾議院了，修墻計(jì)劃更是遙遙無(wú)期。 根據(jù)中期選舉的結(jié)果，民主黨擁有的眾議院233席中，有186位明確反對(duì)，45位沒(méi)有表態(tài)，只有2位表示支持，其中一位是有條件支持。而且更重要的是，在加利福尼亞州、亞利桑那州、新墨西哥州和德克薩斯州4個(gè)美墨邊境州的67位民主黨議員中，61位明確反對(duì)，5位沒(méi)有表態(tài)，一位有條件支持（Jackie Speier，來(lái)自加州第14選區(qū)）。 情況很明了，在政治層面，反對(duì)建墻的力量占優(yōu)勢(shì)，尤其是聯(lián)邦層面。根據(jù)美國(guó)兩院的政治制度設(shè)計(jì)，在“把持”眾議院的民主黨的反對(duì)下，邊境墻相關(guān)法案幾乎不可能通過(guò)。 但特朗普的“墻”并不是無(wú)人支持，其在民眾中有著相當(dāng)?shù)拿褚饣A(chǔ)。一名伊拉克老兵，“紫心勛章”獲得者Brian Kolfage先生，在眾籌網(wǎng)站GoFundMe發(fā)起了為“特朗普墻”捐款的活動(dòng)，三天時(shí)間就募集到超過(guò)700萬(wàn)美元。 那么特朗普怎么辦？如今已經(jīng)不是在競(jìng)選狀態(tài)，部分支持民眾的游行、帶著工具和水泥去邊境支援、抑或發(fā)起募捐等活動(dòng)，都不是決定性因素，唯一可行的，就是想辦法使得法案通過(guò)。為了達(dá)到這個(gè)目的，特朗普進(jìn)行了一系列眼花繚亂的操作。 首先，我們來(lái)看看民主黨人反對(duì)的原因。主要原因很簡(jiǎn)單，至少在紙面上很簡(jiǎn)單：沒(méi)錢。到2018年11月底，美國(guó)國(guó)債總規(guī)模達(dá)到21.8萬(wàn)億美元，相當(dāng)于當(dāng)年名義GDP總量（約20萬(wàn)億美元）的109%。 加上特朗普的減稅大招，財(cái)政收入增幅明顯收窄，才0.4%。而軍費(fèi)等開支迅速增加，政府債臺(tái)高筑，2018年財(cái)年財(cái)政赤字同比增幅高達(dá)17%，所謂地主家也沒(méi)有余糧，難怪反對(duì)的聲音很明確：“完全是浪費(fèi)納稅人的時(shí)間和金錢”。 在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上，商人出身的特朗普自然門清，他一開始就口號(hào)式、創(chuàng)造性的提出讓墨西哥負(fù)擔(dān)修墻的費(fèi)用，所謂新時(shí)代的“主動(dòng)畫地為牢”。當(dāng)然，墨西哥沒(méi)有那么上道，總統(tǒng)培尼亞明確表示墨西哥不會(huì)出這個(gè)錢。 緊接著，特朗普提出第二個(gè)方式，也就是所謂“間接付款”，先從聯(lián)邦政府資金支付“造墻”費(fèi)用，但最終會(huì)通過(guò)一個(gè)“復(fù)雜的形式”的“付款機(jī)制”由墨西哥政府承擔(dān)。在2018年12月13日，特朗普聲稱最近簽署的《美國(guó)-墨西哥-加拿大貿(mào)易協(xié)定》對(duì)美國(guó)有利，美國(guó)因此“賺取了”修墻的費(fèi)用，當(dāng)然此言論遭受了政敵的無(wú)情嘲笑。 在無(wú)數(shù)次聲明不管是直接還是間接由墨西哥出錢的同時(shí)，在具體操作上，特朗普的手法非常經(jīng)典和嫻熟，態(tài)度非常強(qiáng)硬自信。由于美國(guó)政府債臺(tái)高筑，無(wú)法通過(guò)長(zhǎng)期的撥款法案。 自美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算程序于1976年正式執(zhí)行以來(lái)，一直通過(guò)短期支出法案來(lái)維持政府運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。而如果因?yàn)閮牲h斗爭(zhēng)或者其他原因未能通過(guò)短期法案，聯(lián)邦政府就會(huì)“停擺”，只保留核心部門繼續(xù)工作，而且還可能沒(méi)有工資。自1976年以來(lái)美國(guó)政府一共“關(guān)門”21次。 2017年1月25日，特朗普簽署了修墻的行政命令，但命令歸命令，錢還在兩院手里。為了要到這一筆據(jù)估計(jì)最多將達(dá)到250億美元的巨款，2018年一年之內(nèi)，政府三次停擺，創(chuàng)造了40年以來(lái)的最高記錄。 特朗普用的方法就是“捆綁交易”，簡(jiǎn)而言之，你不同意我修墻，我就不同意相關(guān)整體預(yù)算案，特朗普曾表示，不通過(guò)“修墻”經(jīng)費(fèi)的法案，其他法案也別想通過(guò)。政府沒(méi)錢了，那就先關(guān)門，或者按照特朗普的說(shuō)法“光榮地關(guān)門”。 第一次發(fā)生在2018年1月20日，特朗普希望用“修墻”來(lái)交易 “童年抵美者暫緩遣返”計(jì)劃，沒(méi)有達(dá)成，停擺3天；第二次發(fā)生在2018年2月9日，一位共和黨議員反對(duì)其中涉及增加赤字的部分并拒絕投票，“技術(shù)性停擺”3小時(shí)；第三次，創(chuàng)造歷史的“跨年了”。 特朗普聲稱：“這也不錯(cuò)啊，我無(wú)所謂，我就是要為了邊境安全而讓政府關(guān)門”。當(dāng)然，這不是新鮮事，歷史上美國(guó)政府會(huì)故意關(guān)閉某些公共服務(wù)，用以影響公眾，也就是所謂的“華盛頓紀(jì)念碑綜合癥”。 現(xiàn)在元旦已過(guò)，新年伊始，相信特朗普的“修墻斗爭(zhēng)”還會(huì)繼續(xù)不停地斗下去。相對(duì)于擴(kuò)軍、貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)等“大問(wèn)題”，邊境墻問(wèn)題看起來(lái)要“具體而微”。而正是這樣一共具體問(wèn)題，是特朗普心目中的頭等大事，因?yàn)檫@直接牽涉到他的競(jìng)選承諾，更直接表明了他的政治主張，以及“領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力”。 所以這堵墻是否能解決非法移民問(wèn)題——事實(shí)上墻肯定解決不了，特朗普不會(huì)去關(guān)心，他所關(guān)心的是，如何迫使國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)法案，撥款修墻，甚至于如何向美國(guó)民眾秀出他對(duì)于修墻一事的努力，并通過(guò)法案的交易，達(dá)成其他政治主張。 這樣，他才能在在選民心中修起“心墻”，確保即便他其他關(guān)于擴(kuò)軍、貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)等夸下?？诘膽?zhàn)略，沒(méi)有達(dá)到“使美國(guó)更偉大”的經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)效應(yīng)的時(shí)候，他還有“政績(jī)”來(lái)為連任打下“民意的基礎(chǔ)”。正所謂，政客不管墻何為，為了政績(jī)強(qiáng)說(shuō)墻，說(shuō)的是民意、打的滿是主義，到頭來(lái)還是生意。 文章選自觀察者網(wǎng)，2019年1月12日
2019年1月16日 -
Laurence Brahm: We have a smaller planet
By Laurence Brahm,?a senior research fellow at CCG What are the differences between Chinese and Westerners in terms of their life attitude? I think those differences are becoming less and less, as there are more and more similarities. Those similarities are a factor of communication, trade, globalizing ideas, and the fact that we are having more global integration among more countries and cultures. You find Chinese people here drinking red wine and eating Western food. You go to America, and you find people eating Chinese food, Japanese food, Thai food and so on. You see Westerners learning traditional Asian martial arts. Now in the gyms trending across China, you see Chinese learning mixed martial arts fighting and Western boxing. The truth is that we have a smaller planet. This is a whole different era today. Chinese are all over the world. They are buying the international brands and, in many ways, driving the consumption of those brands. They have no barriers and no surprises. It’s not about seeing the foreigners, as they’ve seen the world. And they are bringing a lot of those ideas back, just like during the Tang Dynasty (618-907), when Chang’an was the melting pot and everything was coming in. In many ways, China’s major cities today, and now the second-tier cities, are melting pots. All kinds of international influences are coming in and mixing with Chinese culture in this kind of fusion complex, which has always really been the foundation of China’s own unique culture. It takes, it absorbs, it brings things together and it makes them uniquely Chinese. What’s happening is that we see more communication. With that, we will have more understanding, and a breakdown of barriers and stereotypes. You can enjoy my world, yes, and I can enjoy your world. In that sense, our world is smaller. What’s very important is if we can work together to save that world against the costs and threats of climate change, of human-induced pollution. Remember, this planet is just a little spaceship orbiting in a huge universe. We all have to work together to steer it in the right direction. While China was struggling with complete scarcity in the past, it is now one of the biggest buyers of luxury goods. Has the accumulation of wealth brought changes to the Chinese people’s value system? There’s a concept in economics called conspicuous consumption. When people suddenly have money, they want to show it. I remember when I just came to China in 1981, this was an economy of scarcity. There was nothing. You had money, but there was nothing to buy. Slowly with investment, with trade, with integration with the rest of the world, they began to have things. In the 80s, they began to have electronics, and they filled their homes with refrigerators, washing machines and things that they never had before. Previously, people had to buy their food that day to cook for that day, because there were no refrigerators. At the end of the 80s, people’s homes were filled with electronics. It was not about being able to meet their needs; it was about wanting to show others that they had accumulated their wealth. Then they began the cycle of brand buying and showing off wealth -- who has the bigger house, or who has the bigger car. But that’s not the narrative of the young generation in China today. I’ve seen more young Chinese as hippies in Nepal and India. They see the world differently from their parents. Today’s youth in China are coming up with really creative ideas and having a whole different vision of values, and of presenting those values not through conspicuous consumption, but alternative styles. The whole vision of the Chinese future is changing very rapidly with the new generation. You can’t lock onto the old conspicuous consumption and say that is China. That was China. But now with the millennial generation, and younger, it’s changing really fast. One of the things that’s happening now is that, with more and more foreign students coming to China and more Chinese students going abroad, a lot of the barriers that existed in the old generations are coming down, and they are coming down quite quickly. It’s one thing to read about China in the newspaper, or to see it on the news. It’s another thing to have gone to China to study, to work, to live, to be with people and to make friends locally. It’s this type of people-to-people communication. If it can be brought to the level of politicians, there will be no trade wars, and there will be no conflicts. It’s not a question of integrating Chinese culture with the world’s culture, or vice versa. I think it’s a question of expanding the bandwidth of understanding. The more we understand something, the less we are afraid of it. Fear arises from lack of understanding. Fear arises from the unknown. If we know, then we are not afraid. One of the things that happens to somebody when they leave their culture and live in another culture is that they evolve into that culture. You have in many ways a whole generation now of hybrid cultures and fusion cultures. I’d like to think of us as global nomads. We are international citizens who don’t necessarily belong to one culture or another. Hopefully we can embrace many cultures, and in that respect, bring our planet a little closer together. About Author? Laurence Brahm,?a senior research fellow at Center for China and Globalization(CCG), an author of?Zhu Rongji?and?the Transformation of Modern China.
2019年1月16日
